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Abstract
Since the introduction of the stable marriage problem (SMP) by Gale and Shapley (1962),
several variants and extensions have been investigated. While this variety is useful to
widen the application potential, each variant requires a new algorithm for finding the
stable matchings. To address this issue, we propose an encoding of the SMP using answer
set programming (ASP), which can straightforwardly be adapted and extended to suit
the needs of specific applications. The use of ASP also means that we can take advantage
of highly e cient o↵-the-shelf solvers. To illustrate the flexibility of our approach, we
show how our ASP encoding naturally allows us to select optimal stable matchings, i.e.
matchings that are optimal according to some user-specified criterion. To the best of our
knowledge, our encoding o↵ers the first exact implementation to find sex-equal, minimum
regret, egalitarian or maximum cardinality stable matchings for SMP instances in which
individuals may designate unacceptable partners and ties between preferences are allowed.
KEYWORDS: Answer Set Programming, Logic Rules, Stable Marriage Problem, Optimal
Stable Matchings
1 Introduction
The stable marriage problem (SMP) is a well-known matching problem introduced
by Gale and Shapley (1962). The input of an SMP instance consists of (i) a set of n
men and n women, (ii) for each man a ranking of the women as preferred partners,
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and (iii) for each woman a ranking of the men as preferred partners. A blocking pair
of an SMP instance consists of a man and a woman who are in di↵erent marriages
but both prefer each other to their actual partners. Given the problem, one can
compute a stable matching or stable set of marriages, which is defined as a set of
n couples (marriages) such that there are no blocking pairs. Due to its practical
relevance, countless variants on the SMP have been investigated, enabling a wider
range of applications. Examples of such applications include the kidney-exchange
problem (Irving 2007), which matches donors in incompatible donor-recipient pairs
to compatible recipients in other incompatible pairs and vice versa, and the hospital-
resident problem (Manlove et al. 2002), which matches residents to the free positions
in hospitals. In 2012, Roth and Shapley won the Nobel Prize for Economics for
their theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design, which directly
resulted from an application of the SMP.
In the literature, typically each time a new variant or generalization of the SMP
or a di↵erent optimality criterion is considered, a new algorithm is developed; see
e.g. (Gusfield 1987; Irving et al. 1987; McDermid and Irving 2012), or (Manlove
2013) for an overview. In this paper, we propose to use answer set programming
(ASP) as a general vehicle for modeling a large class of extensions and variations of
the SMP. We show how ASP encodings can be used to compute stable matchings,
and how this encoding can be extended to compute optimal stable matchings. Al-
though the SMP has been widely investigated, and e cient approximation or exact
algorithms are available for several of its variants (Iwama et al. 2010; McDermid
and Irving 2012), to the best of our knowledge, our encoding o↵ers the first exact
implementation to find sex-equal, minimum regret, egalitarian or maximum cardi-
nality stable matchings for SMP instances with unacceptable partners and ties (see
below).
In this paper, we will consider two well-known adaptions of the SMP. First, we will
consider problem instances in which every person can specify a set of unacceptable
partners. The second alteration consists of allowing ties in the preferences, i.e. one
can be indi↵erent between some possible partners. In the literature, the SMP variant
with unacceptable partners – or, equivalently, with incomplete preference lists – is
abbreviated as SMI. The variant with ties is denoted as SMT and the variant which
allows both extensions as SMTI. Note that the original SMP is a special case of
the SMTI, i.e. the set of unacceptable partners is empty for each man and woman,
and there are no ties. Therefore, our paper focusses on the SMTI variant, as it is
the most general one.
Another way to generalize the SMP is by introducing optimality criteria for
stable matchings. This is motivated by the fact that, if multiple stable match-
ings exist, some may be more interesting than others. In this paper, we focus on
sex-equality, minimum regret, egalitarity and maximum cardinality of the stable
matchings, as these are commonly investigated optimality criteria in the matching
literature. Note, however, that there exist several other optimality criteria in the
context of matchings, such as popularity (Ga¨rdenfors 1975), Pareto optimality (Gale
and Sotomayor 1985; Roth and Sotomayor 1990) or profile-based notions such as
rank-maximum (Irving 2003), greedy maximum and generous maximum (Irving
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2003). As this list is non-exhaustive, we refer the interested reader to (Manlove
2013) for an overview.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First we give some background about
the SMP and ASP in Section 2. Then we introduce our encoding of the SMTI with
ASP and prove its correctness in Section 3.1. To illustrate the flexibility of the
approach, we show how it can be used to tackle three-dimensional stable matching
problems in Section 3.2. In Section 4, we first discuss several optimality criteria
and then extend the encoding from Section 3.1, enabling us to find optimal stable
matchings. We show how optimal stable matchings of an SMTI instance can be
found by solving the corresponding induced disjunctive ASP program and prove
the soundness of our approach. This paper is an extended version of (De Clercq
et al. 2013) and additionally provides detailed examples, complete correctness proofs
and an ASP encoding of the three-dimensional stable matching problem. The three-
dimensional stable matching problem is very important for practical applications,
such as the kidney exchange program (Biro´ and McDermid 2010).
2 Background
2.1 The Stable Marriage Problem
To solve the original SMP, Gale and Shapley (Gale and Shapley 1962) constructed
an iterative algorithm —known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm, G-S algorithm or
deferred-acceptance algorithm— to compute a particular stable matching of an
SMP instance. The algorithm works as follows: in round 1 every man proposes to
his first choice of all women. A woman, when being proposed, then rejects all men
but her first choice among the subset of men who proposed to her. That first choice
becomes her temporary husband. In the next rounds, all rejected men propose to
their first choice among the subset of women by whom they were not rejected yet,
regardless of whether this woman already has a temporary husband. Each woman,
when being proposed, then rejects all men but her first choice among the subset
of men who just proposed to her and her temporary mate. This process continues
until all women have a husband. This point, when everyone has a partner, is always
reached after a polynomial number of steps and the corresponding set of marriages
is stable (Gale and Shapley 1962). It should be noted, however, that only one of
the potentially exponentially many stable matchings is found in this way.
The classical SMP can be generalized by (i) allowing men and women to point out
unacceptable partners, i.e. exclude them from their preference list and (ii) dropping
the restriction that the number of men n equals the number of women p. In this
variant, men and women can remain single in a stable matching. Intuitively, one
prefers remaining single over being matched with an unacceptable partner. This
variant is also referred to as the SMP with incomplete preference lists, abbreviated
as SMI. A stable matching for an SMI instance always exists and can be found in
polynomial time (Roth and Sotomayor 1990) by a slightly modified G-S algorithm.
As we focus on an extension of the SMI, we refer to the electronic Appendix A for
the formal definitions of the classical SMP and the SMI.
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The SMI variant can further be generalized by additionally allowing ties in the
preference lists. For this variant (SMTI) there are several ways to define stability,
but we will use the notion of weak stability (Irving 1994). We denote a set of men
as M = {m1, . . . ,mn} and a set of women W = {w1, . . . ,wp}. A set of marriages
or a matching is a collection of man-woman pairs and singles (persons paired to
themselves) such that every man and every woman occurs in just one pair.
Definition 1 (SMTI )
An instance of the SMTI is a pair (SM ,SW ) with SM = { 1M , . . . , nM } and SW =
{ 1W , . . . , pW }. For every i 2 {1, . . . ,n},  iM is a list of disjoint subsets of {1, . . . , p}.
Symmetrically  iW is a list of disjoint subsets of {1, . . . ,n} for every i 2 {1, . . . , p}.
We call  iM and  
i
W the preferences of man mi and woman wi respectively and we
denote the length of the list  iM as | iM |. If k 2  iM (j ), woman wk is in man mi ’s j th
most preferred group of women. All the women in that group are equally preferred
by mi . The case k 2  iW (j ) is similar. If there is no l such that j 2  iM (l), woman wj
is an unacceptable partner for man mi , and similarly when there is no l such that
j 2  iW (l). For every k in the set  iM (| iM |), man mi equally prefers staying single
to being paired to woman wk , and symmetrically for the preferences of a woman
wi . This is the only set in  iM that might be empty, and similar for  
i
W . Man m
and woman w form a blocking pair in a set of marriages S if m strictly prefers
w to his partner in S and w strictly prefers m to her partner in S . A blocking
individual in S is a person who stricly prefers being single to being paired to his
partner in S . A weakly stable matching is a set of marriages without blocking pairs
or individuals.
A weakly stable matching always exists for an instance of the SMTI and it can
be found in polynomial time by arbitrarily breaking the ties (Iwama and Miyazaki
2008). However, as opposed to the SMI variant, the number of matched persons is
no longer constant for every stable matching in this variant.
We introduce the following notations:
acceptableiM =  
i
M (1) [  iM (2) [ . . . [  iM (| iM |  1)| {z }
= preferred iM
[  iM (| iM |)| {z }
= neutral iM
Furthermore unacceptableiM = {1, . . . , p}\acceptableiM . We define the ordering miM
on {wj | j 2 acceptableiM }[{mi} as x miM y i↵ mi prefers person x at least as much
as person y . Note that mi is included in its own preference ordering to encode the
possibility of staying single. The strict ordering <miM is defined in the obvious way
and analogous notations are used for  jW .
Example 1
Suppose M = {m1, m2}, W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} and SM = { 1M = ({1, 3}, {4}),  2M
= ({2, 3}, {})}. Hence man m1 prefers women w1 and w3 to woman w4. There is a tie
between woman w1 and w3 as well as between woman w4 and staying single. Woman
w2 is unacceptable for man m1. Man m2 prefers woman w2 and w3 to staying single,
but finds w1 and w4 unacceptable. It holds that w1 <
m1
M m1, i.e. m1 prefers marrying
w1 over staying single, acceptable1M = {1, 3, 4}, preferred1M = {1, 3}, neutral1M = {4}
and unacceptable1M = {2}.
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2.2 Answer Set Programming
Answer set programming or ASP is a form of declarative programming (Brewka
et al. 2011). Its transparence, elegance and ability to deal with ⌃P2 -complete prob-
lems make it an attractive method for solving combinatorial search and optimization
problems. An ASP program is a finite collection of first-order rules
A1 _ . . . _ Ak  B1, . . . ,Bm ,not C1, . . . ,not Cn
where A1, . . . ,Ak ,B1, . . . ,Bm ,C1, . . . ,Cn are predicates, possibly negated by ¬,
and not is the negation-as-failure operator, whose meaning is explained below. The
semantics are defined by the ground version of the program, consisting of all ground
instantiations of the rules w.r.t. the constants that appear in it (see e.g. (Brewka
et al. 2011) for a good overview). This grounded program is a propositional ASP
program. The building blocks of these programs are atoms, literals and rules. The
most elementary are atoms, which are propositional variables that can be true or
false. A literal is an atom or a negated atom, denoted with ¬. Beside strong negation,
ASP uses a special kind of negation, namely negation-as-failure (naf), denoted with
‘not ’. For a literal a we call ‘not a’ the naf-literal associated with a. The extended
literals consist of all literals and their associated naf-literals. A disjunctive rule has
the following form
a1 _ . . . _ ak  b1, . . . , bm ,not c1, . . . ,not cn
where a1, . . . , ak , b1, . . . , bm , c1, . . . , cn are literals from a fixed set L, determined
by a fixed set A of atoms. We call a1 _ . . . _ ak the head of the rule while the
set of extended literals b1, . . . , bm ,not c1, . . ., not cn is called the body. The rule
above intuitively encodes that a1, a2, . . . or ak is true when we have evidence that
b1, . . . , bm are true and we have no evidence that at least one of c1, . . . , cn is true.
When a rule has an empty body, we call it a fact ; when the head is empty, we speak
of a constraint. A rule without occurrences of not is called a simple disjunctive rule.
A simple disjunctive ASP program is a finite collection of simple disjunctive rules
and similarly a disjunctive ASP program P is a finite collection of disjunctive rules.
If each rule head consists of at most one literal, we speak of a normal ASP program.
We define an interpretation I of a disjunctive ASP program P as a subset of L.
An interpretation I satisfies a simple disjunctive rule a1 _ . . . _ ak  b1, . . . , bm
when a1 2 I or a2 2 I or . . . or ak 2 I or {b1, . . . , bm} 6✓ I . An interpretation
which satisfies all rules of a simple disjunctive program is called a model of that
program. An interpretation I is an answer set of a simple disjunctive program P
i↵ it is a minimal model of P, i.e. no strict subset of I is a model of P (Gelfond and
Lifschitz 1988). The reduct PI of a disjunctive ASP program P w.r.t. an interpre-
tation I is defined as the simple disjunctive ASP program PI = {a1 _ . . . _ ak  
b1, . . . , bm | (a1_. . ._ak  b1, . . . , bm ,not c1, . . . ,not cn) 2 P, {c1, . . . , cn}\I = ;}.
An interpretation I of a disjunctive ASP program P is an answer set of P i↵ I is
an answer set of PI .
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Example 2
Let P be the ASP program with the following 4 rules:
man(john) , person(john) , person(fiona) 
woman(X ) _ child(X ) person(X ),not man(X )
The first 3 rules are facts; hence their heads will be in any answer set. The fourth
rule encodes that any person who is not a man, is a woman or child. The latter rule
is grounded to 2 rules in which X is resp. replaced by john and fiona. We check that
the interpretation I = {man(john),woman(fiona), person(john), person(fiona)} is
an answer set of the ground version of P by computing the reduct PI . As the
grounded rule with X = john is deleted since man(john) is in I , PI is:
man(john) , person(john) , person(fiona) 
woman(fiona) _ child(fiona) person(fiona)
It is clear that I is a minimal model of this simple program, so I is an answer
set of P. By replacing woman(fiona) by child(fiona) in I , another answer set is
obtained.
To automatically compute the answer sets of the programs in this paper, we have
used the ASP solver DLV (www.dlvsystem.com), due to its ability to handle predi-
cates, disjunction and numeric values, with built-in aggregate functions (Faber et al.
2008). The numeric values are only used for grounding.
3 Modeling the Stable Marriage Problem in ASP
3.1 Modeling the SMTI in ASP
In this section we model the SMTI, using ASP. A few proposals of using non-
monotonic reasoning for modeling the SMP have already been described in the
literature. For instance, in (Marek et al. 1990) a specific variant of the SMP is men-
tioned (in which boys each know a subset of a set of girls and want to be matched
to a girl they know) and in (Dung 1995) an abductive program is used to find a
stable matching of marriages in which two fixed persons are paired, with strict,
complete preference lists. To the best of our knowledge, beyond a few specific ex-
amples, no comprehensive study has been made of using ASP or related paradigms
in this context. In particular, the generality of our ASP framework for weakly sta-
ble matchings of SMTI instances allows to easily adjust the encoding to variants
of the SMP, such as the stable roommate problem (Gale and Shapley 1962), in
which matches need to be found within one group instead of between two groups,
or the three-dimensional stable matching problem (Ng and Hirschberg 1991), which
matches triples between three groups instead of pairs between two.
The expression accept(m,w) denotes that a man m and a woman w accept each
other as partners. The predicate manpropose(m,w) expresses that man m is will-
ing to propose to woman w and analogously womanpropose(m,w) expresses that
woman w is willing to propose to man m. Inspired by the Gale-Shapley algorithm,
we look for an ASP formalization to find the stable matchings.
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Definition 2 (ASP program induced by SMTI )
The ASP program P induced by an instance ({ 1M , . . . , nM }, { 1W , . . . , pW }) of
the SMTI is the program containing for every i 2 {1, . . . ,n}, j 2 {1, . . . , p} the
following rules:
accept(mi ,wj ) manpropose(mi ,wj ),womanpropose(mi ,wj ) (1)
accept(mi ,mi) {not accept(mi ,wk ) | k 2 acceptableiM } (2)
accept(wj ,wj ) {not accept(mk ,wj ) | k 2 acceptablejW } (3)
and for every i 2 {1, . . . ,n}, j 2 acceptableiM :
manpropose(mi ,wj ) {not accept(mi , x ) | x miM wj and wj 6= x} (4)
and for every j 2 {1, . . . , p}, i 2 acceptablejW :
womanpropose(mi ,wj ) {not accept(x ,wj ) | x wjW mi and mi 6= x} (5)
Intuitively (1) means that a man and woman accept each other as partners if they
propose to each other. Due to (2), a man accepts himself as a partner (i.e. stays
single) if no woman in his preference list is prepared to propose to him. Rule (4)
states that a man proposes to a woman if he is not paired to a more or equally
preferred woman. For j 2 neutral iM the body of (4) contains not accept(mi ,mi). No
explicit rules are stated about the number of persons someone can propose to or
accept but as we will see below, in Proposition 1, this is unnecessary. Note that, for
k = max(n, p), the number of grounded rules in the induced ASP program is O(k2).
We now illustrate our approach with an example.
Example 3
Consider the following instance (SM ,SW ) of the SMTI. Let M = {m1,m2} and
W = {w1,w2,w3}. Furthermore:
 1M = ({1}, {2, 3}, {})
 2M = ({2}, {1})
 1W = ({1, 2}, {})
 2W = ({1}, {})
 3W = ({2}, {1}, {})
The ASP program induced by this SMTI instance is:
accept(X ,Y ) manpropose(X ,Y ),womanpropose(X ,Y )
manpropose(m1,w1) 
manpropose(m1,w2) not accept(m1,w1),not accept(m1,w3)
manpropose(m1,w3) not accept(m1,w1),not accept(m1,w2)
accept(m1,m1) not accept(m1,w1),not accept(m1,w2),
not accept(m1,w3)
manpropose(m2,w2) 
manpropose(m2,w1) not accept(m2,w2),not accept(m2,m2)
accept(m2,m2) not accept(m2,w2),not accept(m2,w1)
womanpropose(m1,w1) not accept(m2,w1)
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womanpropose(m2,w1) not accept(m1,w1)
accept(w1,w1) not accept(m1,w1),not accept(m2,w1)
womanpropose(m1,w2) 
accept(w2,w2) not accept(m1,w2)
womanpropose(m2,w3) 
womanpropose(m1,w3) not accept(m2,w3)
accept(w3,w3) not accept(m1,w3),not accept(m2,w3)
If we run the program in DLV, we get three answer sets, containing respectively:
• {accept(m1,w3), accept(m2,w1), accept(w2,w2)},
• {accept(m1,w2), accept(m2,w1), accept(w3,w3)},
• {accept(m1,w1), accept(m2,m2), accept(w2,w2), accept(w3,w3)}.
These answer sets correspond to the three weakly stable matching of marriages
of this SMTI instance, namely {(m1,w3), (m2,w1), (w2,w2)}, {(m1,w2), (m2,w1),
(w3,w3)} and {(m1,w1), (m2,m2), (w2,w2), (w3,w3)}.
The following proposition states that our ASP encoding is sound, i.e. that there
is a bijective correspondence between the answer sets of the induced program and
the weak stable matchings of the SMTI. The complete proof is provided in the
electronic Appendix C.
Proposition 1
Let (SM ,SW ) be an instance of the SMTI and let P be the corresponding ASP
program. If I is an answer set of P, then a weakly stable matching for (SM ,SW ) is
given by {(x , y) | accept(x , y) 2 I }. Conversely, if {(x1, y1), . . ., (xk , yk )} is a weakly
stable matching for (SM ,SW ) then P has the following answer set I :
{manpropose(xi , y) | i 2 {1, . . . , k}, xi 2 M , y <xiM yi _ y = yi 6= xi}
[{womanpropose(x , yi) | i 2 {1, . . . , k}, yi 2W , x <yiW xi _ x = xi 6= yi}
[{accept(xi , yi) | i 2 {1, . . . , k}}
A pair (m,w) is stable if there exists a stable matching that contains (m,w).
In (Manlove et al. 2002) it is shown that the decision problem ‘is the pair (m,w)
stable?’ for a given SMTI instance is an NP-complete problem, even in the absence
of unacceptability. It is straightforward to see that we can reformulate this decision
problem as ‘does there exist an answer set of the induced normal ASP program P
which contains the literal accept(m,w)?’ (i.e. brave reasoning), which is known to be
an NP-complete problem (Baral 2003). Thus our model forms a suitable framework
for these kind of decision problems concerning the SMTI.
3.2 Modeling the 3-Dimensional SMTI in ASP
To illustrate further the flexibility of our ASP approach, we consider a variant of the
SMP and show how small adaptations of the ASP encoding can solve this variant.
Extending the SMP by adding another dimension to the problem was first proposed
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in (Knuth 1976). We work out the three-dimensional SMTI, where n men are to
be matched with p women and r children. Definition 1 can straightforwardly be
generalized to a three-dimensional instance (SM ,SW ,SC ), in which preference lists
of the men are defined over the set of woman-child pairs and similarly the women
have preferences over man-child pairs and the children have preferences over man-
woman pairs. In the three-dimensional case,  iM becoms a list of disjoint subsets of
{1, . . . , p}⇥{1, . . . , r}, and analogously for  jW and  kC . Similarly as before, we can
define the notions of acceptableiM etc. Note that the orderings miM , wjW and ckC
are resp. defined on pairs in W ⇥C , M ⇥C and M ⇥W . A stable matching is now
defined as a set of man-woman-child triples and singles, with the properties that no
man, woman and child can be found such that each of them prefers the pair formed
by the others above their current mates in the matching and no person prefers
being single to being matched with its current mates. The practical relevance of
this problem is pointed out in (Biro´ and McDermid 2010).
Extending the ASP program from Definition 2, we can write an ASP program
induced by an instance of the three-dimensional matching problem.
Definition 3 (ASP program induced by 3D SMTI )
The ASP program P induced by an instance ({ 1M , . . . , nM }, { 1W , . . . , pW }, { 1C ,
. . . ,  rC}) of the 3-dimensional SMTI is the program containing the following rules
for every i 2 {1, . . . ,n}, j 2 {1, . . . , p} and k 2 {1, . . . , r}:
accept(mi ,wj , ck ) manprop(mi ,wj , ck ),womprop(mi ,wj , ck ),
childprop(mi ,wj , ck )
accept(mi ,mi ,mi) {not accept(mi ,wu , cv ) | (u, v) 2 acceptableiM }
accept(wj ,wj ,wj ) {not accept(mu ,wj , cv ) | (u, v) 2 acceptablejW }
accept(ck , ck , ck ) {not accept(mu ,wv , ck ) | (u, v) 2 acceptablekC}
and for every i 2 {1, . . . ,n} and (j , k) 2 acceptableiM :
manprop(mi ,wj , ck ) {not accept(mi , x , y) | (x , y) miM (wj , ck ); (wj , ck ) 6= (x , y)}
and for every j 2 {1, . . . , p} and (i , k) 2 acceptablejW :
womprop(mi ,wj , ck ) {not accept(x ,wj , y) | (x , y) wjW (mi , ck ); (mi , ck ) 6= (x , y)}
and for every k 2 {1, . . . , r} and (i , j ) 2 acceptablejC :
childprop(mi ,wj , ck ) {not accept(x , u, ck ) | (x , y) ckC (mi ,wj ); (mi ,wj ) 6= (x , y)}
Ng and Hirschberg (Ng and Hirschberg 1991) proved that deciding whether a stable
matching exists for the three-dimensional problem – in the absence of unaccept-
ability and ties – is an NP-complete problem. Completely analogously as for the
two-sided SMP, one can prove that this encoding yields a bijective correspondence
between the answer sets of the ASP program and the stable matchings of the three-
dimensional matching problem. Note that, for k = max(n, p, r), the number of
grounded rules in the induced ASP program is O(k3).
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4 Selecting Optimal Stable Matchings
4.1 Notions of Optimality of Stable Matchings
When several stable matchings can be found for an instance of the SMP, some may
be more interesting than others. The stable matching found by the G-S algorithm is
M-optimal (Roth and Sotomayor 1990), i.e. every man likes this set at least as well
as any other stable matching. Exchanging the roles of men and women in the G-S
algorithm yields a W-optimal stable matching (Gale and Shapley 1962), optimal
from the women’s point of view.
While some applications may require us to favour either the men or the women,
in others it makes more sense to treat both parties equally. To formalize some
commonly considered notions of fairness and optimality w.r.t. the SMP, we define
the cost cx (y) of being matched with y for an individual x , where cx (y) = k if y
is x ’s k th preferred partner. More precisely, for a man mi , we define cmi (y) = |{z :
z <miM y}|+1 for every y 2 acceptableiM ; for a woman wj , cwj is defined analogously.
So in case of ties we assign the same list position to equally preferred partners, as
illustrated in Example 4.
Example 4
Let x = m1 be a man with preference list  1M = ({1}, {2, 3}, {4}) then cx (w1) = 1,
cx (w2) = cx (w3) = 2 and w4 yields cx (w4) = 4. The cost for being single would be
4, i.e. cx (m1) = 4, since m1 prefers women w1,w2 and w3 to being single, but is
indi↵erent between being paired to w4 or staying single.
Definition 4 (Optimal Stable Matchings)
Let S be a set of marriages and let S (x ) denote the partner of x in S .
• The sex-equality cost of S is csexeq(S ) = |
P
x2M cx (S (x )) 
P
x2W cx (S (x ))|,
• the egalitarian cost of S is cweight(S ) =
P
x2M[W cx (S (x )),
• the regret cost of S is cregret(S ) = maxx2M[W cx (S (x )), and
• the cardinality cost of S is csingles(S ) = |{z : (z , z ) 2 S}|.
S is a sex-equal stable matching i↵ S is a stable matching with minimal sex-equality
cost. Similarly, S is an egalitarian (resp. minimum regret, maximum cardinality)
stable matching i↵ S is a stable matching with minimal egalitarian (resp. regret or
cardinality) cost.
A sex-equal stable matching assigns an equal importance to the preferences of the
men and women, i.e. the men are as pleased with the matching as the women. An
egalitarian stable matching is a stable matching in which the preferences of every
individual are considered to be equally important, i.e. it minimizes the di↵erence in
happiness of all the men and women. In (Xu and Li 2011) the use of an egalitarian
stable matching is proposed to optimally match virtual machines (VM) to servers
in order to improve cloud computing by equalizing the importance of migration
overhead in the data center network and VM migration performance. A minimum
regret stable matching is optimal for the person who is worst o↵, i.e. there does
not exist a stable matching such that the person who is most displeased with the
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matching is happier than the most displeased person in the minimum regret stable
matching. A maximal or minimal cardinality stable matching is a stable matching
with resp. as few or as many singles as possible. Examples of practical applications
include an e cient kidney exchange program (Roth et al. 2005), which matches
donors of incompatible pairs to recipients of other incompatible pairs and vice
versa, and the National Resident Matching Program (www.nrmp.org) (Manlove
et al. 2002), which matches healthcare professionals to graduate medical educa-
tion and advanced training programs. Maximizing cardinality guarantees that as
many recipients as possible will get a compatible donor and as many healthcare
professionals as possible will get a position.
Remark 1
It might be somewhat confusing that the term utilitarian is more frequently used
in sociological and economical contexts for an optimization of the overall happiness
(here called egalitarian), while egalitarian is more used for an optimization which
minimizes the unhappiness of the individuals (tending more to minimum regret).
However, we will use the cost terms as defined above, since these are standard in
the context of the SMP.
For an overview of literature results concerning the computational complexity of
finding optimal stable matchings in the SMP, SMI, SMT and SMTI, we refer to the
electronic Appendix B.
Note that other notions of preferred matchings have been described in the lit-
erature, such as popularity (Ga¨rdenfors 1975), Pareto optimality (Gale and So-
tomayor 1985; Roth and Sotomayor 1990) or profile-based notions such as rank-
maximum (Irving 2003), greedy maximum and generous maximum (Irving 2003).
For more details on these and other optimality criteria, we refer the interested
reader to (Manlove 2013) for an overview.
4.2 Finding Stable Matchings using Disjunctive Naf-free ASP
As we discuss in Section 4.3, we can extend our ASP encoding of the SMTI such
that the optimal stable matchings correspond to the answer sets of an associated
ASP program. In particular, we use the saturation technique (Eiter and Gottlob
1995) to filter non-optimal answer sets. Intuitively, the idea is to create a program
with 3 components: (i) a first part describing the solution candidates, (ii) a second
part also describing the solution candidates since comparison of solutions requires
multiple solution candidates within the same answer set whereas the first part in
itself produces one solution per answer set, (iii) a third part comparing the solutions
described in the first two parts and selecting the preferred solutions by saturation. It
is, however, known that the presence of negation-as-failure can cause problems when
applying saturation. This is due to the fact that rules containing naf-literals can be
altered in the reduct. To address this issue, we use saturation in combination with
a disjunctive naf-free ASP program instead of the ASP program in Definition 2.
To this end, we use a SAT encoding (Janhunen 2004) of the ASP program in
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Definition 2 and define a disjunctive naf-free ASP program in Definition 5 which
selects particular models of the SAT problem.
Note that our original normal program is absolutely tight, i.e. there is no infinite
sequence l1, l2, . . . of literals such that for every i there is a program rule for which
li+1 is a positive body literal and li is in the head (Erdem and Lifschitz 2003). We
use the completion to derive an ASP encoding for finding optimal stable matchings.
The completion of a normal ASP program is a set of propositional formulas. For
every atom a with a  bodyi (i 2 {1, . . . , k}) all the program rules with head a, the
propositional formula a ⌘ body 01 _ . . ._ body 0k is in the completion of that program,
where body 0i is the conjunction of literals derived from bodyi by replacing every
occurrence of ‘not ’ with ‘¬’. If an atom a of the program does not occur in any
rule head, then a ⌘? is in the completion of the program. Similarly the completion
of the program contains the propositional formula ?⌘ body 01 _ . . . _ body 0l where
the disjunction extends over all the program constraints  bodyi (i 2 {1, . . . , l}).
Because our program is absolutely tight, we know that every propositional model
of the completion will correspond to an answer set of the original program and
vice versa (Erdem and Lifschitz 2003). When applied to the induced normal ASP
program in Definition 2, the completion contains the following formulas, for all
i 2 {1, . . . ,n} and j 2 {1, . . . , p}:
accept(mi ,wj ) ⌘ manpropose(mi ,wj ) ^ womanpropose(mi ,wj ),
accept(mi ,mi) ⌘
^
k2acceptableiM
¬accept(mi ,wk ),
accept(wj ,wj ) ⌘
^
k2acceptablejW
¬accept(mk ,wj ),
and for all i 2 {1, . . . ,n} and j 2 acceptableiM :
manpropose(mi ,wj ) ⌘
^
xmiM wj ,x 6=wj
¬accept(mi , x ),
and similarly for all j 2 {1, . . . , p} and i 2 acceptablejW :
womanpropose(mi ,wj ) ⌘
^
xwjW mi ,x 6=mi
¬accept(x ,wj ),
and for all i 2 {1, . . . ,n} and j 2 unacceptableiM :
manpropose(mi ,wj ) ⌘?,
and similarly for all j 2 {1, . . . , p} and i 2 unacceptablejW :
womanpropose(mi ,wj ) ⌘? ·
Using these formulas, which form the completion of the normal ASP program
from Definition 2, we can define an equivalent disjunctive ASP program without
negation-as-failure.
Definition 5 (Induced disj. naf-free ASP program)
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The disjunctive naf-free ASP program Pdisj induced by an SMTI instance (SM ,SW )
contains the following rules for every i 2 {1, . . . ,n}, j 2 {1, . . . , p}:
¬accept(mi ,wj ) _manpropose(mi ,wj ) 
¬accept(mi ,wj ) _ womanpropose(mi ,wj ) 
accept(mi ,wj ) _ ¬manpropose(mi ,wj ) _ ¬womanpropose(mi ,wj ) 
For every i 2 {1, . . . ,n}, l 2 unacceptableiM , j 2 acceptableiM , x miM wj , x 6= wj
Pdisj contains: _
k2acceptableiM
accept(mi ,wk ) _ accept(mi ,mi) 
¬accept(mi ,mi) _ ¬accept(mi ,wj ) 
¬manpropose(mi ,wj ) _ ¬accept(mi , x ) _
xmiM wj ,x 6=wj
accept(mi , x ) _manpropose(mi ,wj ) 
¬manpropose(mi ,wl) 
and symmetrical for j 2 {1, . . . , p} and womanpropose.
Note that, for k = max(n, p), the number of grounded rules in the induced naf-free
program is O(k3). The following lemma follows from the fact that the completion
corresponds to the original program (Erdem and Lifschitz 2003).
Lemma 1
Let P be the normal ASP program from Definition 2 and Pdisj the disjunctive ASP
program from Definition 5. It holds that for any answer set I of P there exists an
answer set Idisj of Pdisj such that the atoms of I and Idisj coincide. Conversely for
any answer set Idisj of Pdisj there exists an answer set I of P such that the atoms
of I and Idisj coincide.
4.3 ASP Program to Select Optimal Solutions
Let (SM ,SW ) be an SMTI instance with SM = { 1M , . . . , nM } and SW = { 1W , . . . ,
 pW }, and let Pnorm be the induced normal ASP program from Definition 2. Our
technique for extending this program to a program that can respectively optimize
for the sex-equality, egalitarian, minimum regret and maximum cardinality criterion
is in each case very similar. We start by explaining it for the case of sex-equality.
Our first step is to add a set of rules that compute the sex-equality cost of a set
of marriages. For every man mi and every x 2 acceptableiM [ {mi} we use the
following rule to determine the cost for mi :
mancost(i , cmi (x )) accept(mi , x ) (6)
and similarly for every wj and every x 2 acceptablejW [ {wj}:
womancost(j , cwj (x )) accept(x ,wj ) (7)
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We also use the following rules with i ranging from 1 to n and j from 1 to p:
manweight(Z ) #sum{B ,A : mancost(A,B)} = Z ,#int(Z ) (8)
womanweight(Z ) #sum{B ,A : womancost(A,B)} = Z ,#int(Z ) (9)
sexeq(Z ) manweight(X ),womanweight(Y ),Z = X   Y
sexeq(Z ) manweight(X ),womanweight(Y ),Z = Y   X (10)
Note that #sum, #max , #int and #count are DLV aggregate functions (Faber
et al. 2008). The ‘A’ mentioned as variable in #sum indicates that a cost must be
included for every person (otherwise the cost is included only once when persons
have the same cost). Rule (8) determines the sum of the male costs and similarly
(9) determines the sum of the female costs. According to Definition 4 the absolute
di↵erence of these values yields the sex-equality cost, as determined by rules (10).
Since numeric variables are restricted to positive integers in DLV, we omit condi-
tions as ‘X   Y ’ or ‘X < Y ’. The program Pnorm extended with rules (6) – (10)
is denoted Psexeqext .
We construct a program Psexeq , composed by subprograms, that selects optimal
solutions. Let P 0disj be the disjunctive naf-free ASP program, induced by the same
SMTI instance, in which a prime symbol is added to all literal names (e.g. accept
becomes accept 0). Define a new program P 0sexeqext with all the rules of P 0disj in which
every occurrence of ¬atom is changed into natom for every atom atom, i.e. replace
all negation symbols by a prefix ‘n’. For every occurring atom atom in P 0sexeqext , add
the following rule to exclude non-consistent solutions:
sat  atom,natom (11)
For instance, the rule sat  accept 0(m1,w1),naccept 0(m1,w1) is added. Finally add
rules (6) – (10) with prime symbols to the literal names to P 0sexeqext but replace rule
(8) and rule (9) by:
mansum 0(n,X ) mancost 0(n,X )
mansum 0(J ,Z ) mansum 0(I ,X ),mancost 0(J ,Y ),Z = X + Y ,#succ(J , I )
manweight 0(Z ) mansum 0(1,Z )
womansum 0(p,X ) womancost 0(p,X )
womansum 0(J ,Z ) womansum 0(I ,X ),womancost 0(J ,Y ),Z = X + Y ,
#succ(J , I )
womanweight 0(Z ) womansum 0(1,Z ) (12)
The DLV aggregate function #succ(J , I ) is true whenever J+1 = I . We replace the
rules with the aggregate function #max by these rules to make sure the saturation
happens correctly. When saturation is used, the DLV aggregate functions #max ,
#sum and #count would not yield the right criterion values. Moreover, DLV does
not accept these aggregate functions in saturation because of the cyclic dependency
of literals within the aggregate functions created by the rules for saturation. These
adjusted rules, however, will not pose any problems because of the successive way
they compute the criterion values. This becomes more clear in the proof of Proposi-
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tion 2. We define the ASP program Psexeq as the union of Psexeqext , P 0sexeqext and Psat .
The ASP program Psat contains the following rules to select minimal solutions
based on sex-equality:
sat  sexeq(X ), sexeq 0(Y ),X  Y (13)
 not sat (14)
mancost 0(X ,Y ) sat ,manargcost 01(X ),manargcost 02(Y )
womancost 0(X ,Y ) sat ,womanargcost 01(X ),womanargcost 02(Y ) (15)
manpropose 0(X ,Y ) sat ,man(X ),woman(Y )
womanpropose 0(X ,Y ) sat ,man(X ),woman(Y )
accept 0(X ,X ) sat ,man(X )
accept 0(X ,X ) sat ,woman(X )
accept 0(X ,Y ) sat ,man(X ),woman(Y ) (16)
and analogous to (16) a set of rules with prefix ‘n’ for the head predicates. Finally we
add the facts manargcost 01(1 · ·n) , manargcost 02(1 · ·(p+1)) , womanargcost 01(1 ·
·p) , womanargcost 02(1 · ·(n+1)) , man(x ) for every man x and woman(x ) 
for every woman x to Psat . The rule manargcost 01(1 · ·n)  is DLV syntax for
the n facts manargcost 01(1)  , . . . ,manargcost 01(n)  . Intuitively the rules of Psat
express the key idea of saturation. First every answer set is forced to contain the
atom sat by rule (14). Then the rules (15) – (16) and the facts make sure that
any answer set should contain all possible literals with a prime symbol that occur
in Psexeq . Rule (13) will establish that only optimal solutions will correspond to
minimal models and thus lead to answer sets. For any non-optimal solution, the
corresponding interpretation containing sat will never be a minimal model of the
reduct. It is formally proven in Proposition 2 below that Psexeq produces exactly
the stable matchings with minimal sex-equality cost.
Furthermore, only small adjustments to Psexeq are needed to create programs
Pweight , Pregret , and Psingles that respectively produce egalitarian, minimum regret
and maximum cardinality stable matchings. Indeed, the ASP program Pweight can
easily be defined as Psexeq in which the predicates sexeq and sexeq 0 are respectively
replaced by weight and weight 0 and the rules (10) are replaced by (17), determining
the egalitarian cost of Definition 4 as the sum of the male and female costs:
weight(Z ) manweight(X ),womanweight(Y ),Z = X + Y (17)
Similarly the ASP program Pregret is defined as Psexeq in which the predicates
sexeq and sexeq 0 are resp. replaced by regret and regret 0 and rules (8) – (10) are
replaced by the following rules:
manregret(Z ) #max{B : mancost(A,B)} = Z ,#int(Z ) (18)
womanregret(Z ) #max{B : womancost(A,B)} = Z ,#int(Z ) (19)
regret(X ) manregret(X ),womanregret(Y ),X > Y
regret(Y ) manregret(X ),womanregret(Y ),X  Y (20)
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Rule (18) determines the regret cost but only for the men. Similarly (19) determines
the regret cost for the women. The regret cost as defined in Definition 4 is the
maximum of these two values, determined by the rules in (20). Again we adjust
rules (18) and (19) for the program part P 0regretext by replacing them with a variant
based on the successor function:
manmax 0(n,X ) mancost 0(n,X )
manmax 0(J ,X ) manmax 0(I ,X ),mancost 0(J ,Y ),X   Y ,#succ(J , I )
manmax 0(J ,Y ) manmax 0(I ,X ),mancost 0(J ,Y ),X < Y ,#succ(J , I )
manregret 0(Z ) manmax 0(1,Z )
womanmax 0(p,X ) womancost 0(p,X )
womanmax 0(J ,X ) womanmax 0(I ,X ),womancost 0(J ,Y ),X   Y ,#succ(J , I )
womanmax 0(J ,Y ) womanmax 0(I ,X ),womancost 0(J ,Y ),X < Y ,#succ(J , I )
womanregret 0(Z ) womanmax 0(1,Z ) (21)
Finally we define the ASP program Psingles as Psexeq in which the predicates
sexeq and sexeq 0 are resp. replaced by singles and singles 0. Furthermore we replace
rules (6) – (10) by (22), determining the number of singles:
singles(Z ) #count{B : accept(B ,B)} = Z ,#int(Z ) (22)
This time we adjust rule (22) for the program part P 0singlesext as follows:
single 0(p + i , 1) accept 0(mi ,mi), single 0(p + i , 0) naccept 0(mi ,mi)
single 0(j , 1) accept 0(wj ,wj ), single 0(j , 0) naccept 0(wj ,wj )
singlesum 0(n + p,X ) single 0(n + p,X )
singlesum 0(J ,Z ) singlesum 0(I ,X ), single 0(J ,Y ),Z = X + Y ,#succ(J , I )
singles 0(Z ) singlesum 0(1,Z ) (23)
Note that, for k = max(n, p), the number of grounded rules in the induced ASP
program is O(k3) for minimum regret and maximum cardinality, but O(k4) for sex-
equalness and egalitarity. The latter programs have a higher number of grounded
rules because of how the weights are counted in the first and second program part.
We illustrate our method with an example.
Example 5
We reconsider Example 3. This SMTI instance had 3 stable matchings of marriages:
• S1 = {accept(m1,w3), accept(m2,w1), accept(w2,w2)},
• S2 = {accept(m1,w2), accept(m2,w1), accept(w3,w3)},
• S3 = {accept(m1,w1), accept(m2,m2), accept(w2,w2), accept(w3,w3)}.
It is easy to compute the respective regret costs as cregret(S1) = 2 and cregret(S2) =
cregret(S3) = 3. The corresponding ASP program selecting this minimum regret
stable matching is the program consisting of the rules in Example 3 in addition to:
man(m1) , man(m2) ,
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woman(w1) , woman(w2) , woman(w3) 
mancost(1, 1) accept(m1,w1), womancost(1, 1) accept(m1,w1)
mancost(1, 2) accept(m1,w2), womancost(1, 1) accept(m2,w1)
mancost(1, 2) accept(m1,w3), womancost(1, 2) accept(w1,w1)
mancost(1, 4) accept(m1,m1), womancost(2, 1) accept(m1,w2)
mancost(2, 2) accept(m2,w1), womancost(2, 2) accept(w2,w2)
mancost(2, 1) accept(m2,w2), womancost(3, 2) accept(m1,w3)
mancost(2, 2) accept(m2,m2), womancost(3, 1) accept(m2,w3)
womancost(3, 3) accept(w3,w3)
manregret(Z ) #max{B : mancost(A,B)} = Z ,#int(Z )
womanregret(Z ) #max{B : womancost(A,B)} = Z ,#int(Z )
regret(X ) manregret(X ),womanregret(Y ),X > Y
regret(Y ) manregret(X ),womanregret(Y ),X  Y
naccept 0(M ,W ) _manpropose 0(M ,W ) man(M ),
woman(W )
naccept 0(M ,W ) _ womanpropose 0(M ,W ) man(M ),
woman(W )
accept 0(M ,W ) _ nmanpropose 0(M ,W ) _ nwomanpropose 0(M ,W ) man(M ),
woman(W )
accept 0(m1,w1) _ accept 0(m1,w2) _ accept 0(m1,w3) _ accept 0(m1,m1) 
accept 0(m2,w1) _ accept 0(m2,w2) _ accept 0(m2,m2) 
naccept 0(m1,m1) _ naccept 0(m1,w1) 
naccept 0(m1,m1) _ naccept 0(m1,w2) 
naccept 0(m1,m1) _ naccept 0(m1,w3) 
naccept 0(m2,m2) _ naccept 0(m2,w1) 
naccept 0(m2,m2) _ naccept 0(m2,w2) 
accept 0(m1,w1) _ accept 0(m2,w1) _ accept 0(w1,w1) 
accept 0(m1,w2) _ accept 0(w2,w2) 
accept 0(m1,w3) _ accept 0(m2,w3) _ accept 0(w3,w3) 
naccept 0(w1,w1) _ naccept 0(m1,w1) 
naccept 0(w1,w1) _ naccept 0(m2,w1) 
naccept 0(w2,w2) _ naccept 0(m1,w2) 
naccept 0(w3,w3) _ naccept 0(m1,w3) 
naccept 0(w3,w3) _ naccept 0(m2,w3) 
nmanpropose 0(m1,w2) _ naccept 0(m1,w1) 
nmanpropose 0(m1,w2) _ naccept 0(m1,w3) 
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nmanpropose 0(m1,w3) _ naccept 0(m1,w1) 
nmanpropose 0(m1,w3) _ naccept 0(m1,w2) 
manpropose 0(m1,w1) 
accept 0(m1,w1) _ accept 0(m1,w3) _manpropose 0(m1,w2) 
accept 0(m1,w1) _ accept 0(m1,w2) _manpropose 0(m1,w3) 
nmanpropose 0(m2,w1) _ naccept 0(m2,w2) 
nmanpropose 0(m2,w1) _ naccept 0(m2,m2) 
manpropose 0(m2,w2) 
accept 0(m2,w2) _ accept 0(m2,m2) _manpropose 0(m2,w1) 
nwomanpropose 0(m1,w1) _ naccept 0(m2,w1) 
nwomanpropose 0(m2,w1) _ naccept 0(m1,w1) 
accept 0(m1,w1) _ womanpropose 0(m2,w1) 
accept 0(m2,w1) _ womanpropose 0(m1,w1) 
womanpropose 0(m1,w2) 
nwomanpropose 0(m1,w3) _ naccept 0(m2,w3) 
womanpropose 0(m2,w3) 
accept 0(m2,w3) _ womanpropose 0(m1,w3) 
nmanpropose 0(m2,w3) 
nwomanpropose 0(m2,w2) 
sat  manpropose 0(X ,Y ),nmanpropose 0(X ,Y ),man(X ),
woman(Y )
sat  womanpropose 0(X ,Y ),nwomanpropose 0(X ,Y ),
man(X ),woman(Y )
sat  accept 0(X ,Y ),naccept 0(X ,Y ),man(X ),woman(Y )
sat  accept 0(X ,X ),naccept 0(X ,X ),man(X )
sat  accept 0(X ,X ),naccept 0(X ,X ),woman(X )
mancost 0(1, 1) accept 0(m1,w1), womancost 0(1, 1) accept 0(m1,w1)
mancost 0(1, 2) accept 0(m1,w2), womancost 0(1, 1) accept 0(m2,w1)
mancost 0(1, 2) accept 0(m1,w3), womancost 0(1, 2) accept 0(w1,w1)
mancost 0(1, 4) accept 0(m1,m1), womancost 0(2, 1) accept 0(m1,w2)
mancost 0(2, 2) accept 0(m2,w1), womancost 0(2, 2) accept 0(w2,w2)
mancost 0(2, 1) accept 0(m2,w2), womancost 0(3, 2) accept 0(m1,w3)
mancost 0(2, 2) accept 0(m2,m2), womancost 0(3, 1) accept 0(m2,w3)
womancost 0(3, 3) accept 0(w3,w3)
manmax 0(2,X ) mancost 0(2,X )
manmax 0(J ,X ) manmax 0(I ,X ),mancost 0(J ,Y ),X   Y ,#succ(J , I )
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manmax 0(J ,X ) manmax 0(I ,X ),mancost 0(J ,Y ),X   Y ,#succ(J , I )
manregret 0(Z ) manmax 0(1,Z )
womanmax 0(3,X ) womancost 0(3,X )
womanmax 0(J ,X ) womanmax 0(I ,X ),womancost 0(J ,Y ),X   Y ,
#succ(J , I )
womanmax 0(J ,X ) womanmax 0(I ,X ),womancost 0(J ,Y ),X   Y ,
#succ(J , I )
womanregret 0(Z ) womanmax 0(1,Z )
regret 0(X ) manregret 0(X ),womanregret 0(Y ),X > Y
regret 0(Y ) manregret 0(X ),womanregret 0(Y ),X  Y
sat  regret(X ), regret 0(Y ),X  Y
 not sat
manargcost 01(1..2) , womanargcost 01(1..3) 
manargcost 02(1..4) , womanargcost 02(1..3) 
mancost 0(X ,Y ) sat ,manargcost 01(X ),manargcost 02(Y )
womancost 0(X ,Y ) sat ,womanargcost 01(X ),womanargcost 02(Y )
manpropose 0(X ,Y ) sat ,man(X ),woman(Y )
nmanpropose 0(X ,Y ) sat ,man(X ),woman(Y )
womanpropose 0(X ,Y ) sat ,man(X ),woman(Y )
nwomanpropose 0(X ,Y ) sat ,man(X ),woman(Y )
accept 0(X ,Y ) sat ,man(X ),woman(Y )
accept 0(X ,X ) sat ,man(X )
accept 0(X ,X ) sat ,woman(X )
naccept 0(X ,Y ) sat ,man(X ),woman(Y )
naccept 0(X ,X ) sat ,man(X )
naccept 0(X ,X ) sat ,woman(X )
Computing the unique answer set of this disjunctive ASP program with DLV and
filtering it to the literals accept and regret , yields {accept(m2,w1), accept(m1,w3),
accept(w2,w2), regret(2)}, corresponding exactly to the minimum regret stable
matching S1 of the SMTI instance and the corresponding regret cost.
We prove that there exists a bijective correspondence between the answer sets
of the induced disjunctive ASP program and the optimal stable matchings of the
SMTI (see electronic Appendix D).
Proposition 2
Let the criterion crit be an element of {sexeq , weight , regret , singles}. For every
answer set I of the program Pcrit induced by an SMTI instance the set SI =
{(m,w) | accept(m, w) 2 I } forms an optimal stable matching of marriages w.r.t.
criterion crit and the optimal criterion value is given by the unique value vI for
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which crit(vI ) 2 I . Conversely for every optimal stable matching S = {(x1, y1), . . . ,
(xk , yk )} with optimal criterion value v there exists an answer set I of Pcrit such
that {(x , y) | accept(x , y) 2 I } = {(xi , yi) | i 2 {1, . . . , k}} and v is the unique value
for which crit(v) 2 I .
Remark 2
If we remove from Psexeq the rules (9) – (10) and replace rule (13) by the rule
sat  manweight(X ), manweight 0(Y ),X  Y , then we obtain the M-optimal
stable matchings. Analogously we can obtain the W-optimal stable matchings.
If a criterion is to be maximized, the symbol  in rule (13) is simply replaced
by  . E.g. for crit = singles we will get minimum cardinality stable matchings.
5 Conclusion
We have shown how ASP programs can be used to encode a number of variations
and generalizations of the SMP. Apart from the availability of e cient ASP solvers,
the main advantage of our approach is its flexibility, allowing us to find solutions
for a wide range of stable matching problems. We can, for instance, compute stable
matchings of variants such as the three-dimensional stable matching problem, as
well as select stable matchings based on optimality criteria, even for problems with
unacceptable partners and ties. We have illustrated our method for sex-equality,
egalitarity, minimum regret and maximum cardinality, but the approach can read-
ily be adapted to other optimality criteria (e.g. popular matchings) or to di↵erent
matching problems (e.g. the roommate problem). To the best of our knowledge,
no other exact algorithms exist to find an optimal stable matching for an SMP
instance with ties, regardless of the presence of unacceptability and regardless of
whether the optimality notion is sex-equality, egalitarity, minimum regret or maxi-
mum cardinality. Therefore, our encoding o↵ers the first exact implementation for
solving the aforementioned problems.
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Appendix A Definition SMP and SMI
Definition 1 (SMP)
An instance of the SMP is a pair (SM ,SW ) with SM = { 1M , . . . , nM } and SW =
{ 1W , . . . , nW }. For every i 2 {1, . . . ,n},  iM and  iW are permutations of {1, . . . ,n}.
We call  iM and  
i
W the preferences of man mi and woman wi respectively. If
k =  iM (j ), woman wk is man mi ’s j
th most preferred woman. The case k =  iW (j )
is similar. Man m and woman w form a blocking pair in a set of marriages S if
m strictly prefers w to his partner in S and w strictly prefers m to her partner
in S . A weakly stable matching is a set of marriages without blocking pairs or
individuals.
Definition 2 (SMI )
An instance of the SMI is a pair (SM ,SW ) with SM = { 1M , . . . , nM } and SW =
{ 1W , . . . , pW }. For every i 2 {1, . . . ,n},  iM is a permutation of a subset of
{1, . . . , p}. Symmetrically  iW is a permutation of a subset of {1, . . . ,n} for ev-
ery i 2 {1, . . . , p}. We call  iM and  iW the preferences of man mi and woman
wi respectively. If k =  iM (j ), woman wk is man mi ’s j
th most preferred woman.
The case k 2  iW (j ) is similar. If there is no l such that j 2  iM (l), woman wj is
an unacceptable partner for man mi , and similarly when there is no l such that
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j 2  iW (l). Man m and woman w form a blocking pair in a set of marriages S if
m strictly prefers w to his partner in S and w strictly prefers m to her partner
in S . A blocking individual in S is a person who stricly prefers being single to being
paired to his partner in S . A weakly stable matching is a set of marriages without
blocking pairs or individuals.
Appendix B Complexity results
Table B 1 presents an overview of known complexity results concerning finding an
optimal stable set1.
Table B 1. Literature complexity results for finding an optimal stable set
sex-equal egalitarian
SMP NP-hard (Kato 1993) P (O(n4) (Irving et al. 1987))
SMI NP-hard (McDermid and Irving 2012)
SMT
SMTI
min. regret max. card.
SMP P (O(n2) (Gusfield 1987)) P (O(n2) (Gale and Shapley 1962))
SMI P (Gale and Sotomayor 1985)
SMT NP-hard (Manlove et al. 2002)
SMTI NP-hard (Manlove 1999; Manlove et al. 2002)
Between brackets we mention in Table B 1 the complexity of an algorithm that
finds an optimal stable set if one exists, in function of the number of men n. To the
best of our knowledge, the only exact algorithm tackling an NP-hard problem from
Table B 1 finds a sex-equal stable set for an SMP instance in which the strict pref-
erence lists of men and/or women are bounded in length by a constant (McDermid
and Irving 2012). To the best of our knowledge, no exact implementations exist to
find an optimal stable set for an SMP instance with ties, regardless of the pres-
ence of unacceptability and regardless which notion of optimality from Table B 1 is
used. Our approach yields an exact implementation of all problems mentioned in
Table B 1.
Appendix C Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1
Let (SM ,SW ) be an instance of the SMTI and let P be the corresponding ASP
program. If I is an answer set of P, then a weakly stable matching for (SM ,SW ) is
given by {(x , y) | accept(x , y) 2 I }. Conversely, if {(x1, y1), . . ., (xk , yk )} is a weakly
stable matching for (SM ,SW ) then P has the following answer set I :
{manpropose(xi , y) | i 2 {1, . . . , k}, xi 2 M , y <xiM yi _ y = yi 6= xi}
1 We assume that P 6= NP
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[{womanpropose(x , yi) | i 2 {1, . . . , k}, yi 2W , x <yiW xi _ x = xi 6= yi}
[{accept(xi , yi) | i 2 {1, . . . , k}}
Proof
Let (SM ,SW ) and P be as described in the proposition. Because of the symmetry
between the men and women we restrict ourselves to the male case when possible.
Answer set ) weak stable set We prove this in 4 steps.
1. For every i 2 {1, . . . ,n}, every j 2 {1, . . . , p} and for every answer set I
of P, it holds that accept(mi ,wj ) 2 I implies that j 2 acceptableiM and i 2
acceptablejW .
This can be proved by contradiction. We will prove that for every man mi
and every j 2 unacceptableiM , accept(mi ,wj ) is in no answer set I of the
induced ASP program P. For accept(mi ,wj ) to be in an answer set I , the
reduct must contain some rule with this literal in the head and a body which
is satisfied. The only rule for which this can be the case is the one of the
form (1), implying that manpropose(mi ,wj ) should be in I . But since j is not
in acceptableiM there is no rule with manpropose(mi ,wj ) in the head and so
manpropose(mi ,wj ) can never be in I .
2. For every answer set I of P and every man mi , there exists at most one
woman wj such that accept(mi ,wj ) 2 I . Similarly, for every woman wj
there exists at most one man mi such that accept(mi ,wj ) 2 I . Moreover,
if accept(mi ,mi) 2 I then accept(mi ,wj ) /2 I for any wj , and likewise when
accept(wj ,wj ) 2 I then accept(mi ,wj ) /2 I for any mi .
This can be proved by contradiction. Suppose first that there is an answer
set I of P that contains accept(mi ,wj ) and accept(mi ,wj 0) for some man
mi and two di↵erent women wj and wj 0 . The first step implies that j and
j 0 are elements of acceptableiM . Either man mi prefers woman wj to woman
wj 0 (wj miM wj 0), or the other way around (wj 0 miM wj ) or man mi has no
preference among them (wj miM wj 0 and wj 0 miM wj ). The first two cases
are symmetrical and can be handled analogously. The last case follows from
the first case because it has stronger assumptions. We prove the first case and
assume that man mi prefers woman wj to woman wj 0 . The rules (4) imply the
presence of a rule manpropose(mi ,wj 0)  . . ., not accept(mi ,wj ), . . . and this
is the only rule which can make manpropose(mi ,wj 0) true (the only rule with
this literal in the head). However, since accept(mi ,wj ) is also in the answer
set, the body of this rule is not satisfied so manpropose(mi ,wj 0) can never be
in I . Consequently accept(mi ,wj 0) can never be in I since the only rule with
this literal in the head is of the form (1) and this body can never be satisfied,
which leads to a contradiction.
Secondly assume that accept(mi ,wj ) and accept(mi ,mi) are both in an an-
swer set I of P. Again step 1 implies that j 2 acceptableiM . Because of the
rules (2), P will contain the rule accept(mi ,mi) . . . ,not accept(mi ,wj ), . . ..
An analogous reasoning as above implies that since accept(mi ,wj ) is in the
answer set I , accept(mi ,mi) can never be in I .
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3. For every man mi , in every answer set I of P exactly one of the following
conditions is satisfied :
(a) there exists a woman wj such that accept(mi ,wj ) 2 I ,
(b) accept(mi ,mi) 2 I ,
and similarly for every woman wi .
Suppose I is an arbitrary answer set of P and mi is an arbitrary man. We
already know from step 2 that a man cannot be paired to a woman while being
single, so both possibilities are disjoint. Therefore, suppose there is no woman
wj such that accept(mi ,wj ) is in I . P will contain the rule (2). Because of
our assumptions and the definition of the reduct, this rule will be reduced to
accept(mi ,mi) , and so accept(mi ,mi) will be in I .
4. For an arbitrary answer set I of P the previous steps imply that I pro-
duces a set of marriages without blocking individuals. Weak stability also
demands the absence of blocking pairs. Suppose by contradiction that there
is a blocking pair (mi ,wj ), implying that there exist i 6= i 0 and j 6= j 0 such
that accept(mi ,wj 0) 2 I and accept(mi0 ,wj ) 2 I while wj <miM wj 0 and
mi <
wj
W mi0 . The rules of the form (1), which are the only ones with the
literals accept(mi ,wj 0) and accept(mi0 ,wj ) in the head, imply that literals
manpropose(mi ,wj 0) and womanpropose(mi0 ,wj ) should be in I . But since
wj <
mi
M wj 0 and because of the form of the rules (4) there are fewer conditions
to be fulfilled for manpropose(mi ,wj ) to be in I than for manpropose(mi ,wj 0)
to be in I . Therefore, manpropose(mi ,wj ) should be in I as well. A similar
reasoning implies that womanpropose(mi ,wj ) should be in I . But now the
rules of the form (1) imply that accept(mi ,wj ) should be in I , contradicting
step 2 since accept(mi ,wj 0) and accept(mi0 ,wj ) are already in I .
Weak stable set ) answer set Suppose we have a stable set of marriages S =
{(x1, y1), . . . , (xk , yk )}, implying that every yi is an acceptable partner of xi and
the other way around. The rules of the form (1) do not alter when forming the
reduct, but the other rules do as those contain naf-literals. Notice first that the
stability of S implies that there cannot be an unmarried couple (m,w), with m a
man and w a woman, such that manpropose(m,w) is in I and womanpropose(m,w)
is in I . By definition of I this would mean that they both strictly prefer each other
to their current partner in S . This means they would form a blocking pair, but since
S was stable, that is impossible. Therefore, the rules of the form (1) will be applied
exactly for married couples (mi ,wj ), since by definition of I manpropose(mi ,wj )
and womanpropose(mi ,wj ) are both in I under these conditions. For other cases the
rule will also be fulfilled since the body will be false. This reasoning implies that the
unique minimal model of the reduct w.r.t. I should indeed contain accept(mi ,wj )
for every married couple (mi ,wj ) in S . Since S is a stable set of marriages, every
person is either married or single. If a man mi is single, there will be no other literal
of the form accept(mi , ·) in I , so rule (2) will reduce to a fact accept(mi ,mi)  ,
which is obviously fulfilled by I . Similarly if a woman wj is single. Any other rule
of the form (2) or (3) is deleted because mi or wj is not single in that case and thus
there is some literal of the form accept(mi ,w) for some woman w and some literal
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of the form accept(m,wj ) for some man m in I , falsifying the body of the rules.
If mi is single, then accept(mi ,mi) is in I and this is the only literal of the form
accept(mi , ·) in I , so the rules of the form (4) will all be reduced to facts. The heads
of these fact rules should be in the minimal model of the reduct and are indeed in
I since the women w for which manpropose(mi ,w) is in I are exactly those who
are strictly preferred to staying single. The rules of the form (4) for women wj in
neutral iM will all be deleted in this case, because accept(mi ,mi) is in I . If man mi
is married to a certain woman wj in the stable set S then the rules of the form
(4) will reduce to facts of the form manpropose(mi ,w) for every woman w who
is strictly preferred to wj and will be deleted for every other woman appearing in
the head, because those rules will contain not accept(mi ,wj ) in the body. Again I
contains these facts by definition, as the minimal model of the reduct should. We
can use an analogous reasoning for the women. The presence of the literals of the
form manpropose(·, ·), womanpropose(·, ·) and accept(·, ·) in I is thus required in
the unique minimal model of the reduct w.r.t. I . We have proved that every literal
in I should be in the minimal model of the reduct and that every rule of the reduct
is fulfilled by I , implying that I is an answer set of P.
Appendix D Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2
Let the criterion crit be an element of {sexeq , weight , regret , singles}. For every
answer set I of the program Pcrit induced by an SMTI instance the set SI =
{(m,w) | accept(m, w) 2 I } forms an optimal stable matching of marriages w.r.t.
criterion crit and the optimal criterion value is given by the unique value vI for
which crit(vI ) 2 I . Conversely for every optimal stable matching S = {(x1, y1), . . . ,
(xk , yk )} with optimal criterion value v there exists an answer set I of Pcrit such
that {(x , y) | accept(x , y) 2 I } = {(xi , yi) | i 2 {1, . . . , k}} and v is the unique value
for which crit(v) 2 I .
Proof
Let (SM ,SW ) be an SMTI instance.
Answer set ) optimal stable matching Let I be an arbitrary answer set of Pcrit
and let SI be as formulated. It is clear that the only rules in Pcrit that influence
the literals of the form manpropose(·, ·), womanpropose(·, ·) and accept(·, ·) are the
rules in Pnorm . Hence I should contain an answer set Inorm of Pnorm as a subset.
Proposition 1 implies that Inorm corresponds to a stable matching SI = {(m,w) |
accept(m,w) 2 Inorm}. Moreover, the only literals of the form manpropose(·, ·),
womanpropose(·, ·) and accept(·, ·) in I are those in Inorm , so SI = {(m,w) |
accept(m,w) 2 I }. If crit = sexeq , it is straightforward to see that the literals of the
form accept(·, ·) in Inorm uniquely determine which literals of the form mancost(·, ·),
womancost(·, ·), manweight(·), womanweight(·) and sexeq(·) should be in the an-
swer set I . These literals do not occur in rules of Pcrit besides those in Psexeqext .
Note that the rules which do contain these literals imply that there will be just one
literal of the form sexeq(·) in I , namely sexeq(v) with v the sex-equality cost of SI .
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Analogous results can be derived for crit 2 {weight , regret , singles}. It remains to
be shown that SI is an optimal stable matching. Suppose by contradiction that SI
is not optimal, so there exists a stable matching S⇤ such that vI > v⇤, with v⇤ the
criterion value of S⇤ to be minimized. We prove that this implies that I cannot be
an answer set of Pcrit , contradicting our initial assumption.
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 imply that there exists an interpretation I ⇤disj of the
ASP program Pdisj induced by (SM ,SW ) that corresponds to the stable match-
ing S⇤. Moreover this interpretation is consistent, i.e. it will not contain atom and
¬atom for some atom atom. This implies that the interpretation I 0disj defined as
I ⇤disj in which ¬atom is replaced by natom for every atom atom will falsify the body
of the rules of the form (11) of P 0critext . An analogous reasoning as above yields that
the literals of the form accept 0(·, ·) in I 0disj uniquely determine which literals of the
formmancost 0(·, ·), womancost 0(·, ·),mansum 0(·, ·), womansum 0(·, ·),manweight 0(·),
womanweight 0(·) and sexeq 0(·) should be in I 0disj . With those extra literals added
to I 0disj , we find that I
0
disj satisfies all the rules of P 0critext . Moreover, crit(v⇤) is the
unique literal of the form crit(·) in I 0disj . Note that I 0disj does not contain the atom
sat .
Define the interpretation J = Inorm [ I 0disj . From the previous argument it fol-
lows that J will satisfy every rule of Pcritext [ P 0critext since the predicates occurring
in both programs do not overlap. Moreover J contains crit(vI ) and crit 0(v⇤) and
these are the only literals of the form crit(·) or crit 0(·). Since vI > v⇤ the rules of
the form (13) will be satisfied by J since their body is always false. Call J 0 the set
J [ {a | (a  ) 2 Psat}. Since J 0 does not contain sat , the rules of Psat will all be
satisfied by J 0, with exception of the rule  not sat .
The rule of the form (14) implies that I , as an answer set of Pcrit , should con-
tain sat . Now the set of rules (15) – (16) imply that I should also contain the
literals mancost 0(·, ·),womancost 0(·, ·) and manpropose 0(·, ·), womanpropose 0(·, ·),
accept 0(·, ·) with the corresponding literals prefixed by n for every possible argu-
ment stated by the facts in Psat . The rules (12), (21) and (23) in P 0critext , by which
we replaced rules (8) – (9), (18) – (19) and (22), guarantee that for every possible
set of marriages and its corresponding criterion value c, I will contain crit(c) and
all associated intermediate results. For example, for crit = sexeq , the rules will
garantuee that I also contains mansum 0(·, ·), manweight(·), womansum(·, ·) and
womanweight(·) for every argument that could occur in a model of P 0critext . Note
that this would not be the case if we used the original rules with #sum, #max
and #count in P 0critext , since these rules would lead to only one value cM for which
e.g. manweight(cM ) should be in I , and similarly only one value cW for which
womanweight(cW ) should be in I . Consequently there would be only one value c
such that crit(c) should be in I . This value would not necessarily correspond to v⇤
and so we would not be able to conclude that I 0disj ✓ I . However, with the current
formulation of the rules we can conclude that I 0disj ✓ I . We already reasoned in
the beginning of the proof that Inorm ✓ I holds so it follows that J ✓ I . Since the
literals of J 0 \ J are stated as facts of Pcritext , they should be in I , hence J 0 ✓ I .
Moreover J 0 ⇢ I since sat 2 I \ J 0.
We use the notation red(P, I ) to denote the reduct of an ASP program P w.r.t.
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an interpretation I . There is no rule in P 0critext with negation-as-failure in the body,
hence red(P 0critext , I ) = red(P 0critext , J 0) = P 0critext . We already reasoned that J 0 satifies
all the rules of the latter. We also reasoned that I does not contain any other liter-
als of the form accept(·, ·) than those which are also in Inorm , and by construction
the same holds for J 0. Hence red(Pcritext , I ) = red(Pcritext , J 0) and by construction J 0
satisfies all the rules of this reduct. It is clear that red(Psat , I ) is Psat without the
rule not sat , since sat 2 I . Again we already argued that J 0 satisfies red(Psat , I ).
Hence J 0 satisfies all the rules of red(Pcrit , I ), implying that I , which strictly con-
tains J 0, cannot be an answer set of Pcrit since it is not a minimal model of the
negation-free ASP program red(Pcrit , I ) (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988).
Optimal stable matching ) answer set Let S = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xk , yk )} be an op-
timal stable matching with optimal criterion value v . To see that the second part
of the proposition holds it su ces to verify that the following interpretation I is an
answer set of Pcrit , with the notation Pxi (y) as the index a for which y 2  lM (a) if
xi = ml and symmetrically Pyi (x ) as the index a for which x 2  l
0
W (a) if yi = wl0 . If
xi = yi we set Pxi (yi) = Pyi (xi) = | iM | if xi is a man and Pxi (yi) = Pyi (xi) = | iW |
otherwise. So let I be given by: I = I1 [ I2 with
I1 ={accept(xi , yi) | i 2 {1, . . . , k}} [ {crit(v)} [ {sat}
[{womanpropose(xi , yi) | xi 6= yi}{manpropose(xi , yi)|xi 6= yi}
[{manpropose(xi , y) | i 2 {1, . . . , k}, xi = ml , 9a < Pxi (yi):y 2  lM (a)}
[{womanpropose(x , yi)|i 2 {1, . . . , k}, yi = wl0 , 9a < Pyi (xi):x 2  l
0
W (a)}
[{mancost(l ,Pxi (yi)) | crit 6= singles, i 2 {1, . . . , k}, xi = ml}
[{womancost(Pyi (xi), l 0) | crit 6= singles, i 2 {1, . . . , k}, yi = wl0}
[{manweight(cM (S )),womanweight(cW (S )) | crit 2 {sexeq ,weight}}
[{manregret(cregret,M (S )),womanregret(cregret,W (S )) | crit = regret}
and
I2 ={manargcost 01(z ) | 1  z  n} [ {manargcost 02(z ) | 1  z  p + 1}
[{womanargcost 01(z ) | 1  z  p}} [ {womanargcost 02(z ) | 1  z  n + 1}
[{man(x ) | x 2 M } [ {woman(x ) | x 2W } (D1)
[{mancost 0(i , j ) | crit 6= singles, 1  i  n, 1  j  p + 1}
[{womancost 0(j , i) | crit 6= singles, 1  i  n + 1, 1  j  p} (D2)
[{manpropose 0(x , y),womanpropose 0(x , y) | x 2 M , y 2W }
[{nmanpropose 0(x , y),nwomanpropose 0(x , y) | x 2 M , y 2W }
[{accept 0(x , y) | x 2 M , y 2W } [ {accept 0(x , x ) | x 2 M [W }
[{naccept 0(x , y) | x 2 M , y 2W } [ {naccept 0(x , x ) | x 2 M [W } (D3)
[{crit 0(val) | val 2 arg(crit)}
[{single 0(i , j ) | crit = singles, 1  i  n + p, j 2 {0, 1}}
[{singlesum 0(i , j ) | crit = singles, 1  i  n + p, 1  j  n + p   i + 1}}
[{mansum 0(i , j ) | crit 2 {sexeq ,weight}, 1  i  n,
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n   i + 1  j  (n   i + 1)(p + 1)}
[{womansum 0(j , i) | crit 2 {sexeq ,weight}, 1  j  p,
p   j + 1  i  (p   i + 1)(n + 1)}
[{manweight 0(z ) | crit 2 {sexeq ,weight},n  z  n(p + 1)}
[{womanweight 0(z ) | crit 2 {sexeq ,weight}, p  z  p(n + 1)}
[{manmax 0(i , j ) | crit = regret , 1  i  n, 1  j  p + 1}
[{womanmax 0(j , i) | crit = regret , 1  j  p, 1  i  n + 1}
[{manregret 0(z ) | crit = regret , 1  z  p + 1}
[{womanregret 0(z ) | crit = regret , 1  z  n + 1} (D4)
The notation arg(c) stands for the possible values the criterion can take within this
problem instance:
• if crit = sexeq then arg(crit) = {0, . . . ,max(np + n   p,np + p   n)},
• if crit = weight then arg(crit) = {n + p, . . . , 2np + p + n},
• if crit = regret then arg(crit) = {1, . . . ,max(p,n) + 1},
• if crit = singles then arg(crit) = {0, . . . ,n + p}.
To verify whether this interpretation is an answer set of Pcrit , we should compute
the reduct w.r.t. I and check whether I is a minimal model of the reduct (Gel-
fond and Lifschitz 1988). It can readily be checked that I satisfies all the rules of
red(Pcrit , I ). It remains to be shown that there is no strict subset of I which satis-
fies all the rules. First of all, all the facts of Pcrit must be in the minimal model of
the reduct, explaining why the sets of literals (D1) should be in I . The only rules
with negation-as-failure are part of Pcritext .
As in the previous part of the proof, it is straightforward to see that I1 is the unique
minimal model of the reduct of Pcritext w.r.t. I , considering that the literals in I2 do
not occur in Pcritext . So any minimal model of red(Pcrit , I ) must contain I1.
The key rule which makes sure that I is a minimal model of the reduct is (13).
The rules (11) imply that for each model of red(Pcrit , I ) that does not contain
sat , the literals of P 0critext in that model will correspond to a stable matching of the
SMTI instance. In that case rule (13) will have a true body, since S is optimal,
implying that sat should have been in the model. And the presence of sat in any
minimal model implies the presence of the set of literals (D4) in any minimal model
of the reduct. This can be seen with the following reasoning. Due to the presence
of the facts (D1) and sat in any minimal model of the reduct, rules (15) imply the
presence of the literals (D2) in any minimal model. For the same reason rules (16)
imply that the literals (D3) should be in any minimal model of red(Pcrit , I ). For
crit = sexeq the presence of the literals of the form (D2) in any minimal model
of the reduct together with rules (12) imply that mansum 0(i , j ) should be in any
minimal model for every i 2 {1, . . . ,n} and j 2 {n   i + 1, . . . , (n   i + 1)(p + 1)}:
for i = n, the first rule of (12) implies that mansum 0(n, x ) is in any minimal model
for every x such that manargcost 02(x ) is in it, i.e. any x 2 {1, . . . , p + 1}. Now
the second rule of (12) implies that mansum 0(n   1, x ) is in any minimal model
for every x + y such that manargcost 02(x ) and mansum 0(n, y) are in it, i.e. any
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x + y 2 {2, . . . , 2(p + 1)}. If we continue like this, it is straightforward to see that
every literal of the form mansum 0(·, ·) of I2 should be in any minimal model. The
third rule of (12) now implies that manweight 0(x ) should be in any minimal model
for every x such that mansum 0(1, x ) is in it, i.e. x 2 {n, . . . ,n(p + 1)}. The same
reasoning can be repeated for the literals womansum 0 and womanweight 0. At this
point rules (10) imply that sexeq 0(|x   y |) should be in any minimal model which
contains manweight 0(x ) and womanweight 0(y). Note that only one of the two rules
in (10) will apply for every x and y since the numerical variables in DLV are pos-
itive. Considering the arguments for which manweight 0 and womanweight 0 should
be in any minimal model, it follows that sexeq 0(x ) should be in any minimal model
for every x 2 {0, . . . ,max(p(n + 1)  n,n(p + 1)  p)}, which is exactly arg(crit).
For the other criteria, an analogous reasoning shows that the presence of all literals
of I2 is required in any minimal model of the reduct.
Considering the fact that we have proved that all literals of I should be in any
minimal model of the reduct and I fulfils all the rules of the reduct, we know that
I is a minimal model of the reduct and thus an answer set of Pcrit .
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